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Abstract 
 
 
Anosognosia for memory loss is a common feature of Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Recent theories 
have proposed that anosognosia, a disruption in awareness at a global level, may reflect specific 
deficits in self-monitoring, or local awareness. Though anosognosia for memory loss has been 
shown to relate to memory self-monitoring, it is not clear if it relates to self-monitoring deficits in 
other domains (i.e., motor). The current study examined this question by analyzing the relationship 
between anosognosia for memory loss, memory monitoring, and motor monitoring in 35 
individuals with mild to moderate AD.  Anosognosia was assessed via clinical interview before 
participants completed a metamemory task to measure memory monitoring, and a computerized 
agency task to measure motor monitoring. Cognitive and psychological measures included 
memory, executive functions, and mood. Memory monitoring was associated with motor 
monitoring; however, anosognosia was associated only with memory monitoring, and not motor 
monitoring.  Cognition and mood related differently to each measure of self-awareness. Results 
are interpreted within a hierarchical model of awareness in which local self-monitoring processes 
are associated across domain, but appear to only contribute to a global level awareness in a domain-
specific fashion.   
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Highlights 
 
 Hierarchical models of awareness for memory loss are assessed in Alzheimer’s disease 
 Self-monitoring in motor and memory domains are associated in Alzheimer’ disease. 
 Self-monitoring processes dissociate in anosognosia for memory loss. 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Individuals with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) are often unaware of their deficits (see Agnew 
& Morris, 1998; Cosentino & Stern, 2005; Rosen, 2011). This disordered higher level self-
awareness, or anosognosia, has been linked to a variety of negative personal and societal 
consequences, with “unaware” individuals engaging in and benefiting less from clinical 
management, demonstrating reduced capacity to make treatment decisions (Clare, Wilson, Carter, 
Roth, & Hodges, 2004; Cosentino, Metcalfe, Cary, De Leon, & Karlawish, 2011; Koltai, Welsh-
Bohmer, & Schmechel, 2001), and engaging in more risky behaviors than those who are aware of 
their deficits (Cotrell & Wild, 1999; Wild & Cotrell, 2003).  Moreover, those responsible for the 
care of unaware patients report higher degrees of stress and burden (Prigatano, 2005; Rymer et al., 
2002; Seltzer, Vasterling, Yoder, & Thompson, 1997), even in the context of Mild Cognitive 
Impairment (MCI) (Kelleher, Tolea, & Galvin, 2016). As efforts to diagnose AD move toward a 
preclinical stage during which individuals have the capacity to be highly functional, if aware of 
their cognitive deficits, understanding the specific metacognitive impairments leading to 
anosognosia in AD may be critical for enabling individuals to maintain their autonomy.  
 There is a growing yet incomplete understanding of the ways in which self-awareness 
breaks down in AD, as well as other conditions such as stroke. Existing models of anosognosia, or 
global awareness, have outlined the ways in which dysfunctional memory and executive systems 
can give rise to disordered awareness in AD (see Agnew & Morris, 1998; Ansell & Bucks, 2006; 
Morris & Mograbi, 2013). However, given that disruptions to memory (Derouesne et al., 1999; 
Reed, Jagust, & Coulter, 1993; Starkstein et al., 1995) and executive functions (Lopez, Becker, 
Somsak, Dew, & DeKosky, 1994; Michon, Deweer, Pillon, Agid, & Dubois, 1994; Reed et al., 
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1993; Starkstein, Sabe, Chemerinski, Jason, & Leiguarda, 1996) do not fully explain anosognosia 
in AD, it is clear that other mechanisms are at play in the deterioration of higher levels of self-
awareness. Currently, there is a drive in both the cognitive and motor literatures towards a dynamic 
and multifaceted notion of self-awareness wherein factors specific to metacognition, not simply 
cognition, give rise to this fascinating disorder (Clare, Markova, Roth, & Morris, 2011; Davies, 
Davies, & Coltheart, 2005; Fotopoulou, 2014; Levine, 1990; Rosen, 2011).  
In this vein, research has begun to examine processes that may be uniquely self-evaluative, 
(i.e., processes that, although potentially dependent on primary cognitive abilities such as memory 
or executive functions, have a unique variance that cannot be simply explained by these primary 
cognitive abilities). One such process is self-monitoring or local awareness—the process by which 
one evaluates aspects of one’s own individual thoughts, intentions and actions compared to those 
of others or those arising from the external world (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Fotopoulou, 2014; 
Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010; McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Rosen, 2011; Saj, Vocat, & 
Vuilleumier, 2014; Venneri & Shanks, 2004). Leading theorists in anosognosia for memory loss 
have conceptualized awareness within a hierarchical structure in their models, with monitoring 
processes, or local awareness, considered to be underlying anosognosia, or higher order global 
awareness (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Clare et al., 2011; Mograbi & Morris, 2013). Previous work 
in AD has linked traditional clinical ratings of anosognosia, understood as a higher level of 
awareness (i.e., global awareness), with performance on memory monitoring or metamemory 
measures, understood as lower levels of awareness (i.e., local awareness) (Clare et al., 2011). 
However, relatively little work has examined the extent to which anosognosia in AD, stroke, or 
other conditions is characterized by broad deficits in self-monitoring or domain specific deficits in 
self-monitoring.  
In the current study, we examined the association between anosognosia for memory loss 
in AD,  memory monitoring, and motor monitoring (i.e., agency judgments, or the extent to which 
individuals perceive themselves to be the agent of a determined outcome or action) (Gallagher, 
2000). There is an inherent necessity of accessing self-specific information when making a 
judgment of agency related to an action or thought, and agency tasks have been used to understand 
unawareness of hemiplegia or other motor deficits following stroke (Fotopoulou et al., 2008), 
providing an ideal framework to examine self-referential monitoring in a non-memory domain. 
Indeed, much of the work dedicated to modeling anosognosia and examining the role of monitoring 
difficulties has occurred in the context of impaired motor functioning, specifically in individuals 
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who are unaware of hemiplegia following stroke (Jenkinson, Edelstyn, Drakeford, & Ellis, 2009; 
Saj et al., 2014; Venneri & Shanks, 2004; Vocat, Saj, & Vuilleumier, 2013). Conceptually, it has 
been proposed that discrepancies in monitoring between one’s intentions (i.e., motor plan) and 
one’s actual motor performance may result in unawareness of hemiplegia (Berti, Spinazzola, Pia, 
& Rabuffetti, 2007; Cocchini, Beschin, Fotopoulou, & Della Sala, 2010; Fotopoulou et al., 2008; 
Moro, Pernigo, Zapparoli, Cordioli, & Aglioti, 2011). The Comparator Model of motor control 
posits that for each produced movement, an individual implicitly monitors their intentions and 
predicted outcome in relation to sensory and perceptual feedback about the actual outcome 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). The comparison between these two processes allows the 
detection of a mismatch that would occur in the context of a movement error, and therefore allows 
correction of the error. The comparison also provides a neural basis for the perception of a 
distinction between internally driven movements (where the match between the two processes is 
high) and those movements caused by an external source (I. Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 2005).  
Another explanatory model of judgments of agency or judgments of motor monitoring is 
the Theory of Mental Causation (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). This theory proposes 
that individuals consciously assess the relationship between intentions and actions, and infer causal 
judgments of agency. This conceptualization moves away from the underlying process of motor 
monitoring, arguing that such processes are unconscious, and proposes that individuals utilize 
conscious processes such as the intention associated with the action and contextual cues of the 
outcome itself, to derive an inferential judgment of agency or judgments of motor monitoring 
(Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Metcalfe, Eich, & Castel, 2010; Moore, 2016; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & 
Newen, 2008; Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).   
 Several studies have supported the association of motor monitoring and anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (e.g., Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010; Vocat et al., 2013). Interestingly, monitoring 
deficits in patients unaware of their motor deficits seem to relate to monitoring deficits in other 
cognitive domains (T. E. Feinberg, Roane, Kwan, Schindler, & Haber, 1994; Jenkinson et al., 
2009; Venneri & Shanks, 2004). These cross-domain associations suggest that at least in the case 
of anosognosia for motor deficits, its underlying mechanisms may not be domain specific and that 
a combination of different processes may be key to the emergence of impaired awareness (e.g., 
deficient error prediction, encoding, monitoring and premorbid factors) (Cocchini, Beschin, & 
Sala, 2002; Davies et al., 2005; Fotopoulou, 2014; Levine, 1990; Marcel, Tegnér, & Nimmo-
Smith, 2004; McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Vuilleumier, 2004). The association of self-monitoring 
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abilities across different task domains has also been demonstrated in non-demented cohorts in 
which the integrity of memory monitoring and motor monitoring (i.e., agency) judgments have 
been linked (Cosentino, Metcalfe, Holmes, Steffener, & Stern, 2011). 
To our knowledge, there are no previous studies examining judgments of agency in AD.  
Given the cross-domain monitoring deficits seen in individuals with anosognosia for hemiplegia, 
and the link between memory monitoring and agency monitoring in older adults, one might 
hypothesize that anosognosia in AD may be associated with compromised agency in AD. 
However, there is also reason to believe that these processes may be dissociated.  While they are 
both self-referential, the substrates that contribute to each judgment are seemingly very different. 
For example, memory monitoring has been hypothesized to rely on memory abilities, executive 
functioning, and underlying implicit internal monitoring of mnemonic processes such as 
familiarity and partial access to information (Cosentino, Metcalfe, Holmes, et al., 2011; Koriat, 
1993; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993; Reder & Ritter, 1992; 
Schnyer et al., 2004; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992).  In contrast,  judgments of agency have been 
hypothesized to rely on the monitoring of sensory and perceptual stimuli of the action, and the 
integration of different contextual cues such as; perceived success, temporal delay between 
intention, and outcome and reward  (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; 
Kirkpatrick, Metcalfe, Greene, & Hart, 2008; Metcalfe, Van Snellenberg, DeRosse, Balsam, & 
Malhotra, 2014; Michotte, 1963; Moore, 2016; Schlottman & Shanks, 1992).  
The purpose of this study is to clarify the association between different domains and levels 
of awareness in AD by examining the relationship between anosognosia for memory loss, memory 
monitoring, and agency. For this purpose, we ran regression models examining the associations 
among these three self-evaluative measures including covariates such as memory, executive 
functions, and mood (Ansell & Bucks, 2006; Bertrand et al., 2016; Cines et al., 2015; Clare et al., 
2012; Conde-Sala et al., 2014; Cosentino, Metcalfe, Holmes, et al., 2011; Mograbi & Morris, 2013; 
Perrotin, Isingrini, Souchay, Clarys, & Taconnat, 2006; Reed et al., 1993). In doing so, this study 
will refine and build upon current models of self-awareness with the goal of improving their 
ultimate utility for guiding the management of anosognosia in AD.  
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2. METHODS 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
As part of a larger study, 51 participants with mild to moderate AD were recruited through 
the Department of Neurology at the Columbia University Medical Center. Participants had a 
diagnosis of Alzheimer’s following the criteria of the Neurologic Disorders and Stroke - 
Alzheimer’s disease and Related Disorders Association (NINDS-ADRDA). Participants were 
excluded from the study if there was evidence of moderate to severe psychiatric illness, history of 
acquired brain injury (traumatic and vascular), or any other neurological conditions that may have 
had an impact on cognition. Participants were also excluded if they scored under 20 in the Mini-
Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) to ensure comprehension of the 
tasks. Participants with atypical presentations of AD that were not characterized primarily by 
memory loss (i.e., language or frontal variant AD) were excluded.  All participants provided 
informed consent and all procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board at Columbia 
University Medical Center.  
As part of the larger study, participants were asked to complete three structured sessions, 
with the main measures of interest for this study administered across the three sessions. Of the 
original sample size of 51 participants, 11 (22%) cases dropped out of the study and failed to 
complete the three visits and 5 cases had missing data on the agency task specifically. Out of these, 
4 (8%) had missing trials because of technical difficulties (e.g., task quitting unexpectedly) and 1 
(2%) case could not follow the instructions. This resulted in a final sample size of 35 participants 
(69% female). The overall mean age of these 35 participants was 77.72 (SD = 9.40; range = 57-
99), and over 91% of the participants were Caucasians; the remaining 9% were African American. 
All participants were assessed across three visits.  
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. Anosognosia 
Anosognosia was evaluated via a brief interview at the beginning of each of the three study 
visits, generating a Clinical Rating of Awareness (CRA) of memory functioning. We used a 
modified version of Reed et al.’s (1993) clinical awareness scoring categories. Participants were 
asked an open-ended question about their memory (i.e., “how is your memory?”). Based on 
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participants’ responses, the examiner rated their awareness with the following scoring system: 1.00 
= Full Awareness (Patient spontaneously complains of significant memory loss and may discuss 
memory loss as consequential of the disease); 2.00 = "Moderate Awareness" (Patient 
spontaneously admits significant  memory loss but attributes it to normal aging); 3.00 = "Shallow 
Awareness" (Patient is inconsistent or uncertain about memory loss); 4.00 = "No Awareness" ( 
Patient denies memory loss). Repeated measures examined if there were significant differences of 
awareness across the three visits before averaging these into one score. For the purposes of this 
study, the scoring ratings were then collapsed into two categories (1-2 = “Aware”; >2- 4 = 
“Unaware”) in line with previous publications (Cosentino et al., 2016). 
2.2.2. Cognitive Measures 
Participants underwent neuropsychological examination, which included measures of 
global cognition, memory, executive functions, and attention. Memory measures consisted of the 
Philadelphia Verbal Learning Task (PVLT - Price et al., 2009) for verbal memory and the Biber 
Figure Learning Test (Glosser, Goodglass, & Biber, 1989) as a nonverbal memory measure. 
Executive function measures included a design fluency task (Glosser & Goodglass, 1990), a verbal 
fluency task (i.e., FAS - Stuss & Benson, 1986), and the Digit and Spatial  backward spans from 
the Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised (WMS-R - Wechsler, 1997). Attention was assessed with 
a visual scanning task. Cognitive index scores were obtained from these measures to represent 
three main cognitive domains: memory, executive functions, and attention. A memory index score 
was obtained by averaging z scores of the total immediate recall and long delayed recall of both 
the PVLT and the Biber Figure learning memory tests. An executive index score was derived from 
an average of the Digit and Spatial spans backward, FAS, and Design fluency z scores. Finally, an 
attention score was derived from the z scores of the visual scanning task (Cosentino, Metcalfe, 
Holmes, et al., 2011). 
2.2.3. Mood  
Mood was assessed with the 30 item Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS). This measure 
includes a variety of items targeting symptoms of depression such as sadness, hopelessness, 
dissatisfaction with life, and worthlessness. Higher scores represent higher endorsement of 
depressive items, with a cut off of 10 as indicative of probable depression. This measure has been 
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shown to have high validity and reliability in measuring the construct of depression (Yesavage et 
al., 1982). 
2.2.4.  Self-Monitoring Measures 
Memory Monitoring Task. A modified Feeling of Knowing or FOK task was used in this study. 
As part of this task, participants underwent three different task conditions (standard, query, and 
feedback; described below) counterbalanced across three visits. Task condition and trivia set were 
compared and analyzed to determine that performance was not affected by condition before 
collapsing the scores. Each condition of the FOK task was comprised of four trials with five items 
per trial.  Prior to commencing all trials, participants were instructed: (i.e., “During this task, I am 
going to tell you about five people. I will tell you their name and something about their 
background. Your task is to try to remember this information as best you can. Please listen 
carefully”). After hearing the information read aloud, participants were asked to give a global 
Judgment of Learning (JOL) (i.e., “Now I am going to test your memory for those names, giving 
you answer choices. Of the five names, how many do you think you will get right?”). Then, for 
each of the five items, participants were shown the individual question and asked to estimate the 
likelihood of knowing the right answer (FOK judgment) (i.e., “There are eight possible answers 
on the next page. Will you know which one is right – Yes, Maybe, or No?”). After each FOK 
judgment, participants were shown eight answer choices that included the correct answer as well 
as seven distractors. These seven distractors included the other four names that had been presented 
in the learning trials, and three unrelated distractors. This procedure was the same for each 
condition (standard, query and feedback) except that for the query and feedback conditions, in 
which one more element was included. In the query condition, participants were also asked to 
make a judgment, after each item, regarding the accuracy of their answer. In the feedback 
condition, the examiner provided participants with verbal feedback on the accuracy of their 
response after each item. Each of the four global JOLs provided before each trial ranged from 0 to 
5. Item level prediction judgments were given ordinal values of 0 = No, 0.5 = Maybe, and 1 = Yes. 
Performance (i.e., memory) accuracy had values of 0 = incorrect and 1 = correct to enable the 
calculation of the measures below.  
Resolution (Gamma). Resolution reflects the extent to which participants are able to adjust their 
predictions for performance on each item in line with actual memory performance on that item.  
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Resolution was measured with the Goodman-Kruskal gamma statistic; a rank order correlation that 
is based on the total amount of concordances across the test (C; predictions for performance on 
an item are heightened when performance on that item is high, and vice versa) and the total number 
of discordances (D; predictions for performance on an item are lowered when performance on that 
item is high, and vice versa).  Gamma is calculated as (C-D)/(C+D). Following this formula, more 
concordances will result in a value of gamma closer to 1 (perfect resolution), whilst the opposite 
will result in a value of gamma closer to -1. This calculation does not take in account the number 
of “ties” where predictions and accuracy are equal in two pairs. Therefore, if someone “ties” across 
all pairs, gamma cannot be calculated. To avoid losing data in these cases, a formula was developed 
so that a value of 0 was assigned to gamma, representing the randomness or no association between 
predictions and actual accuracy (see Cosentino et al., 2015).  
Calibration. Calibration scores reflect the extent to which individuals are generally over or under 
confident in their predictions. For this study, two measures of calibration were obtained, global 
calibration judgments and item level calibration. 
Global calibration judgments reflect the overall level of predictive confidence participants 
had in their upcoming performance for each 5-item learning trial. These scores were calculated for 
each of the four trials by subtracting predictions of accuracy (ranging from 0-5) from total accuracy 
(ranging from 0-5) and dividing by 5 (the total number of items in the trial). The global calibration 
judgments represent the average score across all four trials. Values closer to 0 represent accurate 
judgments. Positive values indicate overconfidence, and negative values indicate under-
confidence. 
 Item level calibration indicates the extent to which participants are under- or over 
confident in their performance at the item by item level (i.e., “Will you know whether this item is 
right? Yes? Maybe? No?”). Predictions were given a score of 0 if the participant stated they would 
not recognize the correct choice, 0.5 if they were not sure and stated “maybe”, and a score of 1 if 
they were sure they would recognize the right answer. Memory recognition accuracy was scored 
as 0 if they chose the wrong answer, and 1 if they chose the correct answer. Item level calibration 
was calculated by summing all predictions for performance within all trials, subtracting the sum 
of accuracy scores, and dividing by the total number of items (e.g., (∑ prediction – ∑ accuracy)/ 
total items). The resulting measure reflects the extent to which a patient is overconfident (positive 
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values), or under confident (negative values) in their item-level predictions compared to their 
actual performance. Item level calibration was calculated across each of the four trials and 
averaged to create a single score. A final average score was computed across conditions (i.e., 
standard, query and feedback). 
Agency Task. A computer task was used to measure patients’ ability to monitor when they were 
or were not in control of motor outcomes whilst playing a simple computerized game. A 
modified version of Metcalfe and Greene's (2007) task was used (see Cosentino, Metcalfe, 
Holmes, et al., 2011). In this task, participants were required to move the cursor of a computer 
horizontally across the bottom of the screen to try to “catch” as many “X”s as possible whilst 
avoiding the “O”s, both of which were falling vertically in the screen. In the modified version of 
Metcalfe and Greene's task, on some of the trials, participants were in complete control of the 
computer mouse, and so they should have said that they were 'in control.'; on other trials, the 
computer interfered with the position of the cursor, and so on these trials, to the extent that they 
correctly recognized their own lack of control over the cursor, they should have said that the 
computer was ‘in control’. Participants were given 1 practice trial, 8 trials in which they were in 
complete control of the cursor, 8 trials in which the computer controlled the cursor, and 8 mixed 
trials in which they were in control half of the time and the computer took over the other half. 
These mixed trials were introduced to enhance uncertainty. In computer controlled trials, the 
cursor on the screen moved directly towards the proximal target in a linear fashion without 
actively attempting to avoid O’s.  The person's own mouse movements had no effect on this 
trajectory.  The trials were presented in random order and each had a duration 10 seconds. 
To begin each trial, the participant had to move the cursor. If they failed to do so, a message 
would inform them that the game would not begin if they did not perform a movement. This 
avoided the strategy of waiting to see if the computer moved the cursor. At the end of each trial 
participants were required to make a judgment of agency (i.e., “who was in control”) between two 
dichotomous choices of themselves or the computer as being in control.   
Agency judgments, or motor monitoring, was measured as the total accuracy of all 
judgments on self-and computer-based trials. A combined score of both trial types ranged from 0 
to 16. Accuracy for each trial was also derived which ranged from 0 to 8 in each. Mixed trials 
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were excluded from analysis. The inclusion of trials in the analysis followed that of Cosentino et 
al., (2011) to allow comparison of our results with those of healthy ageing individuals. 
2.2.5. Computer Experience Questionnaire  
 Three questions regarding computer experience were presented to participants about how 
often and how comfortable they felt using a mouse: (i) “How often did you use a mouse before the 
study?”, responses were recorded in a Likert scale from 0 = Never, 1 = A few times, and 2 = Many 
times; (ii) “How comfortable are you using a mouse ?”, responses were recorded in a Likert scale 
from 0 = Not comfortable, 1 = Somewhat comfortable, and 2 = Very comfortable; (iii) “How often 
did you use a mouse last year?”, responses were recorded in a Likert scale from 0 = Never, 1 = A 
few times, 2 = Several times a month, 3 = Several times a week, and 4 = Daily. A composite score, 
used as a measure of overall computer experience, was developed by averaging the results of the 
three questions.  
2.3. Statistical analysis 
GLM and non-parametric Friedman tests for repeated measures were used to explore 
differences between metacognitive and CRA scores administered across the three visits before 
averaging these into one score. Two-tailed independent t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests were 
used to explore differences in cognitive and other self-evaluative measures (memory monitoring 
and judgments of agency) between participants aware and unaware of their memory deficits as 
defined by the CRA. Bivariate one and two-tailed Pearson’s and Spearman correlations were then 
used to examine the relationship between the self and computer trials of the agency test, between 
agency and computer experience, and between agency and memory monitoring measures. Finally, 
linear and logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine the correlates of CRA, memory 
monitoring and agency.  
 
3. RESULTS 
 
3.1. Descriptive Results 
 
3.1.1. Anosognosia 
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Anosognosia was examined through CRA at each visit. A non-parametric Friedman test 
for repeated measures revealed no significant difference of awareness ratings across the three 
sessions (χ2 (2) = .95, p = .62). The scores of the three visits were averaged to provide a composite 
score, and the scores were then collapsed into two categories described in the methods (aware and 
unaware). 57% of our sample was classified as unaware (shallow or no awareness) and 43% as 
aware of their memory deficits (full or moderate awareness). The awareness groups did not differ 
significantly in demographic variables (see Table 1).  
With regard to cognitive tasks, unaware participants appeared to perform somewhat worse 
on memory tasks, though this qualitative difference was not significant (t (33) = -1.69, p = .10). 
No differences were found in executive functions (t (29) = .11, p =.90), or attention (t (32) = 1.61, 
p = .11).  Depressive symptoms were comparable across groups (U = 94, z = -1.87, p = .06). 
 
 
---------INSERT TABLE 1--------- 
 
3.1.2.  Memory Monitoring Task  
As noted in the methods section, the data presented in this paper are part of a larger study, 
and participants were exposed to three different FOK conditions (standard, query and feedback). 
GLM Repeated measures corrected for Green House Geisser showed no difference in memory 
monitoring as measured by gamma across the conditions (F (1.62, 50.24) = 1.72, p = .19). 
Similarly, GLM repeated measures for prospective global calibration judgments revealed no 
differences across conditions for either the global or item level predictions (F (2, 56) = .64, p = 
.53; F (2, 62) = 1.26, p = .28). These metacognitive metrics were therefore averaged across visits 
to create composite scores for comparison with agency and anosognosia for memory loss. Within 
the memory monitoring scores, resolution (i.e., gamma) was not significantly correlated with item 
calibration (r = .28, p = .11) or global calibration judgments (r = -.11, p = .55).   
3.1.3. Agency Task  
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Bivariate Pearson’s correlation revealed no association between accuracy of agency 
judgments in self trials and computer trials (r = - .10, p = .54). Therefore, agency was broken down 
into two scores reflecting each trial type and examined separately in subsequent analyses. Overall, 
both unaware and aware participants performed significantly better on self trials (M = 6.02, SD = 
1.69) as compared to computer trials (M = 2.40, SD = 2.38) (t (34) = 7.02, p < .001; d = 1.75).  
3.1.4. Computer Experience Questionnaire 
Computer mouse experience data were available for 25 participants. Out of these, 44% 
reported using a mouse before the study many times, whilst 24% had used it a few times, and 32% 
had never used one. More specifically, 64% of participants reported using the mouse at least once 
within the last year. Finally, participants were asked how comfortable they felt using a mouse, and 
36% reported being very comfortable, 24% somewhat comfortable and 40% not comfortable.  The 
relationship between computer experience and agency was not significant for self (r = 0.00, p = 
.99) or computer trials (r = .33, p = .11).  
3.2. Bivariate Relationships between Awareness Measures 
Comparison of the three memory monitoring metrics (gamma, global, and item level 
calibrations) between unaware and aware participants showed a significant difference only for the 
gamma score (t (33) = -3.02, p =.005; d = 1.06; see Table 2) such that participants who were 
unaware of their deficits tended to have lower resolution scores—that is, unaware participants 
showed greater difficulties in predicting their memory performance. This difference remained 
significant after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. There were no differences 
between anosognosic and aware participants in the accuracy of their agency judgments for self 
trials (t (33) = -.51, p = .61) or computer trials (t (33) = 0.00, p = 1.00). Total judgments of agency 
showed a qualitative but not significant association with gamma (r = .28, p = .0501; d =.57). 
Although the correlation between the accuracy of the agency judgments on the computer trials and 
the resolution gamma correlations was not significant (r = .11, p = .25), an association was found 
between the accuracy of agency judgments for self trials and the resolution gamma correlations (r 
= .30, p = .04). 
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---------INSERT TABLE 2--------- 
 
3.3. Regression analyses  
Because our interest was in exploring the relation between the three measures of self-
evaluation (i.e., memory monitoring as measured by gamma, CRA, and agency), these three 
variables were included in all models as dependent variables and/or predictors, adjusting for 
potential covariates. Covariates were selected on theoretical bases as well based on previously 
shown associations. The first linear regression was conducted to examine the extent to which 
gamma could be predicted by scores on agency self trials, CRA, mood, memory, and executive 
function indexes, entered in a single block. Results indicated that the overall model was significant 
and explained 50 % of the variance (R2 = .50, F (5, 28) = 5.77, p = .001). It was found that higher 
memory (B = .25, p = .002), greater accuracy for agency self trials (B = .08, p = .008), and higher 
clinical rated awareness (B = .23, p = .03) significantly predicted higher gamma. When controlling 
for demographics, including age, sex and education, the model remained significant, as did the 
three predictors.  
Two additional linear regressions were conducted to examine the predictors of accurate 
judgments of agency in the self trials and in the computer trials. Predictors included the executive 
function index, gamma, CRA, and computer experience. The overall model, however, was not 
significant for either the self (R2 = .30, F (5, 19) = 1.68, p =.19) or the computer trials (R2 = .21, F 
(4, 20) = 1.31, p =.30).  
Finally, a logistic regression was conducted to explore the extent to which CRA could be 
predicted by gamma, agency accuracy for self trials, mood, memory, and executive function, 
entered in one block. Results indicated that the overall model was significant (χ2 (5) = 13.37, p 
=.02) and explained 44 % of the variance (Nagelkerke R2) in clinically rated awareness. Increasing 
accuracy in gamma was associated with increased likelihood of being aware of their memory 
deficits (B = 3.77, Wald χ2 (1) = 4.42, p = .03) as was endorsing more depression in the Geriatric 
Depression scale (B = .21, Wald χ2 (1) = 4.10, p = .04).  No other predictors were significant.  
When controlling for demographics, only gamma remained a significant predictor of clinically 
rated awareness. All predictors, for each model, are summarized in Table 3. 
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---------INSERT TABLE 3--------- 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
This paper examined the extent to which anosognosia (i.e., a global marker of awareness) 
in AD is characterized by deficits in specific aspects of online self-monitoring (i.e., lower level of 
awareness) across domains. Moreover, we explored whether these specific forms of self-
monitoring deteriorate in tandem or are dissociable processes. By exploring different measures of 
self-awareness, this study seeks to understand how different aspects of self-evaluation operate in 
the context of AD. 
The conceptualization of the association between local awareness (monitoring) and global 
awareness (anosognosia) —previously described as different levels of awareness—is represented 
in two of the most influential models of awareness, the Conscious Awareness Model (CAM) and 
Clare and colleagues’ Hierarchical Model – (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Clare et al., 2011). In the 
CAM, domain specific monitoring processes are located at a lower level (i.e., cognitive 
comparator mechanisms (CCMs) (see Figure 1). Supervising each of these domain-specific 
mechanisms is a central supervisory process, described to function under executive control. The 
CCMs are specified as those in charge of comparing recent errors in given domains with previous 
experiences, giving rise to global, higher order self-evaluation of one’s abilities. Based on this 
formulation, dissociation between anosognosia (global awareness) across different domains would 
be due to a domain-specific comparator (Cm) impairment. On the other hand, a dysfunctional 
central supervisory system would lead to anosognosia across domains (i.e., executive anosognosia) 
(Agnew & Morris, 1998; McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004; Morris & 
Mograbi, 2013). That said, this conceptualization has not been experimentally assessed.  
In Clare et al.’s (2011) hierarchical model of awareness, ongoing monitoring processes 
during a task, in which current errors can be detected, are defined as performance monitoring. 
Superior to this level lies the evaluative judgment and the meta-representation levels, where 
awareness can be reached though informant interview and in depth clinical interview with the 
16 
 
patient. These superior levels of awareness can also be described as global levels of awareness, as 
they rely on lower levels to produce a stable representation of one self, one that provides the 
continuity of an individual through time.  
 
---------INSERT FIGURE 1--------- 
 
 
The representation of a lower level or local level of awareness, as measured through 
memory monitoring judgments (i.e., gamma), and its association to a more global level of 
awareness, as measured through clinical interview (i.e., CRA) is supported in the current and 
previous studies (Cosentino et al., 2015; Cosentino, Metcalfe, Butterfield, & Stern, 2007; 
Cosentino, Metcalfe, Cary, et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2016). Similarly, there was a link between 
local levels of awareness across domains, as measured by gamma and the accuracy of the agency 
judgments for self trials.  
The main question that we attempted to answer in this paper was the extent to which 
individuals with anosognosia for memory loss in AD demonstrated deficits at the lower level of 
awareness (or metacognitive output) in self-monitoring mechanisms beyond memory. This was 
explored by assessing agency judgments in relation to anosognosia. If monitoring deficits 
underlying anosognosia are not domain specific, agency should be distorted in anosognosic 
patients. The lack of an observed association between anosognosia and judgments of agency in 
our study suggests that the mechanisms of awareness in AD are modular, at least to some extent, 
across the domains of memory and motor functioning. The pattern of performance on the agency 
task was very similar in both aware and unaware patients, with a clear trend for higher performance 
on self trials than computer trials. In computer trials, both aware and unaware participants 
performed below chance. A similar pattern of findings has been previously observed in controls 
(i.e., healthy ageing adults), who completed the same agency task, performing worse on computer 
trials than self trials (Cosentino et al., 2011). Interestingly, previous literature has supported that 
agency changes with age, specifically that, as people age, they tend to disregard or become more 
resistant to external cues when making judgments of agency (Cioffi, Cocchini, Banissy, & Moore, 
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2017; Metcalfe et al., 2010). Our participants were indeed older than the healthy ageing 
participants studied in the previous study, and thus they might be showing an exacerbated inability 
to appropriately weigh external cues when making these judgments. Further, due to drop out and 
technical difficulties, some participants did not complete the motor monitoring task. This might 
have included some bias in our results as it is not clear if those not considered in the final analyses 
might have performed differently than those completing the full study. As both memory and motor 
monitoring measures were related, we explored this possibility by comparing our main memory 
monitoring measure (i.e., gamma) in those participants included in the study (N=35) against the 
16 participants who did not complete the motor monitoring task. We did not observe any 
significant difference in their abilities to monitor their memory performance as measured in the 
first visit (e.g., FOK task, first visit (t (49) =1.04, p=.31). 
Taken together, the current results support the notion that within-domain awareness such 
as memory, may be associated across levels (i.e., CRA and gamma), but cross-domain monitoring 
(e.g., motor and memory monitoring) may be associated only within a given level of awareness 
(i.e., gamma and agency). Though Morris & Mograbi’s (2013) CAM parallels Clare and 
colleagues’ (2011) in terms of its hierarchical progress from ‘unimodal to heteromodal processes’, 
the CAM does not explicitly address the potential for different levels of metacognitive output (e.g., 
local contextual judgments of memory and motor performance versus global offline memory 
awareness). While the CAM does include conscious perception of error through the Metacognitive 
Awareness System (MAS), which also serves as an ‘emergent’ process that can represent 
metacognitive judgments in general, we suggest that it may be useful to conceptualize different 
levels of metacognitive output separately as the processes and factors associated with each level 
of output can differ (Clare et al., 2011; Perrotin, Belleville, & Isingrini, 2007). Figure 2 provides 
an attempt to incorporate our pattern of results into existing models of awareness. As shown in 
that figure, we propose a simplified model of the different levels of metacognitive output focused 
on the two domains explored in this paper. 
 
 
---------INSERT FIGURE 2--------- 
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Based on the CAM model and our findings, monitoring of performance depends on domain 
specific monitors (i.e., CCMs), identified as unconscious processes that can lead to a local 
metacognitive output of performance (e.g., context local judgment of motor or memory 
monitoring). At the same time, these monitors are part of the evaluative process by which an 
individual makes more global and stable judgments of their own abilities. Specific deficits to each 
CCM would contribute to a domain specific anosognosia. Following the CAM and the motor 
literature of anosognosia, some individuals may have a more generalized impairment in executive 
control, leading to a generalized impairment of monitoring across domains. In our sample of 
individuals suffering from AD, we found support for a domain specific CCM deficit (i.e., Cm) 
contributing to a specific global awareness deficit.  The relationship between Cm (memory) and 
Cn (motor), however, speaks to a shared variance at a local level of awareness.  
 Finally, our examination of the cognitive and mood correlates of each self-evaluation 
measure revealed different predictive factors associated with different levels of memory 
awareness. Specifically, within the cognitive factors, poorer memory performance was a 
significant predictor of deficits in memory monitoring (i.e., gamma). People who were less able to 
monitor their memory functioning were also more likely to have lower memory scores. This 
relationship between memory and awareness went in the same direction for CRA, but was not 
significant. Memory has been proposed to be a predictive factor for both levels of awareness (e.g., 
local memory monitoring and global memory awareness). This association between memory 
impairment and anosognosia provides support for the mnemonic model of anosognosia as 
described by the CAM. Individuals suffering from mnemonic anosognosia are theorized to fail to 
encode and or recall information about their memory deficits. Consequentially, their global 
representation of  memory abilities remains ‘petrified’ in time (Mograbi, Brown, & Morris, 2009).  
Similarly, associations between memory and monitoring have been interpreted through the 
memory-constraint hypothesis for example which assumes that memory monitoring relies on an 
inferential process by which one derives a judgment based on different cues such as familiarity or 
accessibility of target.  These cues are, themselves, hypothesized to be byproducts of the retrieval 
process (Koriat, 2000; Metcalfe, 2000; Metcalfe et al., 1993). The quality of the cues retrieved by 
people with memory difficulties would be hampered, resulting in a blurring of the distinctiveness 
between what is known and what is not.  Thus, the memory-constraint hypothesis also predicts 
that poor memory would  lead to poor memory monitoring (Hertzog, Dunlosky, & Sinclair, 2010).   
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The association between memory and metamemory in AD has been inconsistent 
throughout the literature and our previous work.  Our impression is that the presence or absence 
of this association depends to a large extent on the disease severity of the sample.  While memory 
awareness and disease severity are not linked in a one to one fashion (awareness is highly variable 
in the early stage of AD), disease progression is generally associated with decreasing awareness 
as individuals move along the dementia spectrum as the increased overall cognitive difficulties 
complicate available processes for accurate realization of one deficits.  As such, it is possible that 
the association between memory impairment and awareness emerges more strongly when 
individuals with various levels of memory loss are included in a given sample.  
By way of contrast with memory performance, the executive function index was not 
associated with either memory monitoring (i.e., gamma) or anosognosia (i.e., CRA) in our data. In 
contrast to the findings presented here, executive functions have been hypothesized to be 
associated with both CRA and memory monitoring (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Schacter, 1990; 
Shimamura, 1995). Such a relation between executive functions and global level of awareness 
would support the executive model of anosognosia, where due to an executive failure, the ongoing 
experience of making a memory error is neither monitored nor detected. As noted earlier, this 
definition establishes that monitoring is supported by executive supervisory processes. Similarly, 
monitoring of memory has been proposed to be reliant on underlying executive processes, and 
similarities between these two processes have been highlighted (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & 
Posner, 2000; Shimamura, 2000). Of note, although such an association between memory 
monitoring and executive functions has been supported in healthy ageing individuals, the 
relationship is not so clear with AD and other dementias (Perrotin et al., 2006; Souchay, Isingrini, 
& Espagnet, 2000; Souchay, Isingrini, Pillon, & Gil, 2003), and was not observed in our study. 
The association of both levels of awareness, memory and executive function, has not been 
consistent across studies (Correa, Graves, & Costa, 1996; Cosentino et al., 2007; Dalla Barba, 
Parlato, Iavarone, & Boller, 1995; DeBettignies, Mahurin, & Pirozzolo, 1990; Michon et al., 1994; 
Reed et al., 1993; Shaked et al., 2014; Starkstein et al., 1996). As mentioned earlier, these 
contradictory results can be partially explained through the differences between sampling methods 
and measures used (Clare, 2004; Cosentino & Stern, 2005). Another possibility is that impairment 
in memory or executive function alone is not sufficient to cause anosognosia or memory 
monitoring deficits, as other process likely contribute to self-reflection.  It has also been suggested 
that cognitive and metacognitive processes may simply be concomitant deficits effected in the 
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neurodegenerative process.  For example, previous work by Shaked et al. (2014), showed that an 
index of non-verbal memory and non-verbal executive functions was more closely related to 
memory monitoring (i.e., gamma) than was a verbal index of these cognitive domains. These 
results were interpreted within a neuroanatomic framework as potentially pointing to differential 
disruption in right hemisphere networks critical for processing nonverbal information as well as 
for supporting self-reflective processes (Cosentino, 2014).  
Lastly, in regards to mood, our results showed different relations between depression and 
our three measures of self-evaluation. Specifically, we found that endorsing higher levels of 
depression was associated with being globally more aware of one’s memory deficits, consistent 
with a number of previous studies (Bertrand et al., 2016; Cines et al., 2015; Conde-Sala et al., 
2014), but not with memory monitoring. These findings support a previously shown dissociation 
of the correlates found between these measures of self-evaluation. For example, Cosentino, 
Metcalfe, Cary, et al. (2011) found that decision making capacity pertaining to medication 
management was related to global memory awareness but not local (gamma). The authors 
suggested that global awareness likely reflects a general, context independent higher level of 
awareness. On the other hand, memory monitoring, as measured by gamma, is a specific and local, 
context dependent lower level of awareness. This argument might explain the observed 
dissociation in our study between mood and the two measures of self-awareness. As suggested by 
Clare and colleagues, and consistent with the Hierarchical model, global measures of awareness 
may in part reflect beliefs, premorbid factors, or psychological functioning, as they are not 
constrained by the same type of specific contextual details that constrain self-evaluative judgments 
in the context of local awareness measures (Clare et al., 2012). As such, local metacognitive 
evaluations might reflect a more ‘objective’ or ‘pure’ measure of someone’s self-evaluative ability.  
To conclude, while global unawareness in AD (i.e., anosognosia) seems to break down in 
tandem with deficits in mnemonic self-monitoring (i.e., gamma), anosognosia for memory loss 
was not associated with local self-monitoring processes in the motor domain as measured by 
metacognition of agency in the data presented here. However, the local or online forms of self-
evaluation that are at play during agency judgments appear to relate to those used to make 
judgments about mnemonic self-monitoring. That is, it seems that within-domain awareness may 
be associated across levels, but cross-domain monitoring may be associated only within their level 
of awareness (i.e., local awareness). Future research should examine other types of monitoring 
processes as well as anosognosia for other deficits, to evaluate the extent and qualitative 
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differences of self-monitoring at different levels of awareness for memory and other deficits. Due 
to the important clinical implications of deficits in awareness among individuals suffering from 
AD, it is essential that we continue to refine our current theoretical models of self-awareness. 
Doing so will open the door to shaping specific rehabilitation programs in order to minimize the 
negative consequences of unawareness. 
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Figure 1. Modified version of the revised CAM model from Morris and Mograbi (2013). Comparator mechanisms 
proposed to underlie monitoring of different cognitive domains highlighted. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Metacognitive output of global and local levels of awareness in both memory and motor domains. Solid 
lines represent relationships found in this current study. Dotted arrows represent relationships previously shown in 
anosognosia for hemiplegia but not assessed in this study (see Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010; Saj et al., 2014; Vocat 
et al., 2013). CRA – Clinically rated awareness; SRD – Subjective rating discrepancy; Cm – memory comparator; Cn 
– motor comparator. 
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Table 1. Mean and standard deviations of demographic and neuropsychological variables in participants unaware 
and aware of their memory difficulties. 
 
Demographics details, mood and 
neuropsychological performance 
Unaware 
(n=20) 
Aware 
(n=15) 
Sig. Two 
tailed 
95 % 
Confidence 
intervals 
Age 79.94 (8.02) 74.78 (10.54) .10 - - 1.21, 11.54  
Education 16.00 (2.73) 16.73 (3.10) .46 -1.55, 11.87 
Gender (female/male) 14/6 10/5 .94 - 
Race (Caucasian/African American) 19/1 13/2 .38 - 
MMSE (0-30) 25.05 (1.93) 25.07 (2.18) .98 -1.43, 1.40 
Memory index (Z score) -.20 (.58) .19 (.79) .10 -.86, .07 
Executive Index (Z score) .01 (.89) -.01 (.80) .69 -.28, .41 
Attention Index (Z score) .11 (1.03) -.15 (1.02) .48 -.49, 1.00 
Mood (0-30)* 3.00 (6.75) 7.00 (9.00) .06 - 
Higher scores on MSMSE reflect better performance. Higher scores in the Mood variable reflect higher endorsement 
of depressive items. *Non normal data is reported as median and interquartile ranges.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Mean and standard deviations of metacognitive measures for memory and agency in participants unaware 
and aware of their memory deficits. 
Metacognitive measures of 
memory and motor domains 
(range) 
Unaware 
(n=20) 
Aware 
(n=15) 
Sig. Two 
tailed 
95% Confidence 
intervals  
 
Gamma (-1–1) .18(.34) .50(.26) .005 -.53, -.10 
Global calibration (-1–1) .07(.18) .09(.18) .72 -.15, .10 
Item level calibration (-1–1) .01(.12) .02(.08) .78 -.08, .06 
Agency total (0-16) 8.30(2.61) 8.60(3.04) .76 -2.25, 1.65 
Agency computer trials (0–8) 2.40(2.11) 2.40(2.77) 1.00 -1.67, 1.67 
Agency self trials (0–8) 5.90(1.74) 6.20(1.65) .61 -1.48, .88 
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Table 3. Regression models of self-awareness measures of memory monitoring (gamma), anosognosia (CRA), and 
the accuracy of agency judgments in self trials and in computer trials. 
Predictors of memory monitoring 
(gamma), CRA and agency 
Gamma              
Β (Std. error) 
CRA            
Β (Std. error) 
Agency       
self trials                
Β (Std. error) 
Agency 
computer trials 
B (Std. error) 
Gamma  - 3.77 (1.79) 1.47 (1.47) 2.10 (1.87) 
CRA .23 (.10) - .23 (.82) - .81 (1.05) 
Agency self .08 (.03) -.15 (.32) - - 
Executive functions - .02 (.09)  -.14 (.87) - .01 (.77) .69 (.97) 
Memory .25 (.07)  .12 (.88) - - 
Mood - .01 (.01) .21 (.10)  - - 
Computer experience - - - .03 (.13) .24 (.16) 
Unstandardized betas and standard errors of the individual predictors are included. Significant predictors are shown 
in bold (p < .05).    
 
 
 
